On Realism
Philosophy ·Representational realism claims that there are external objects which exists independent of a mind perceiving it and one’s experience of these objects are merely internal ideas. In this essay, I will present an argument in favour of representational realism and assess its soundness.
The strongest argument for representational realism, perhaps, is the simplicity argument by Bertrand Russell. Russell built this argument on John Locke’s theory of presentative realism. Supposing physical objects are granted existence, Russell’s argument may be generalised as follow:
P1. Sense-data suggests changes in physical objects when I do not perceive them.
P2. Common-sense explanation for such changes, that physical objects continue to exist even when I do not perceive them, is a simple and natural one without any difficulties.
P3. Other accounts for change in physical objects, that they cease to exist when I do not perceive them, comes with many difficulties and requires complicated explanations.
P4. Every principle of simplicity urges us to adopt the natural (and simple) view (Russell (1912).
C. Therefore, it is reasonable to belief that there are objects other than ourselves and our sense-data which have an existence not dependent upon our perceiving them (Russell 1912).
Russell’s abductive reasoning relies on inference to the best explanation. It offers a simple account for the changes in our observations of a subject, during a time interval in which we do not perceive it. The various forms of simplicity principle , agrees that we should adopt to the most natural and simple view. The assumption that physical objects do exist should not cause us difficulties because Russell’s focus is on the reasonability for believing matter exists, rather than the certainty of its existence. As far as Russell is concerned, a reasonable enough and harmless idea which has the potential to benefit shall be accepted.
One could argue that it is possible to have equally simple explanations, but each disagrees with another. Historically, the geocentric model of the universe was taught by ancient Greek philosophers for hundreds of years because it provided a plausible, natural understanding of the universe as was observed. Later observations inspired the heliocentric model which provided equally reasonable understanding of the universe. Since the certainty of a physical object behind an observation is not guaranteed, one cannot with certainty, accept one model and reject the other. But these ideas are paradoxical; one must accept one and reject the other. Without certainty, can we arrive at any natural understanding at all?
Despite the difficulty with uncertainty, Russell would urge us to believe in our observations, for it offers the theoretical likelihood of one version of reality. There is no harm in believing in either geocentric model or heliocentric model of the universe, both had inspired humanity of what lies beyond the world it once knew. Russell’s solution is that we should systematise our beliefs, starting with those that we hold most strongly. As we continue to make observations, we compare the results with existing beliefs and rule out any inconsistences. Only by accepting appearance and reality as a whole, can we effectively arrive at empirical proofs for new ideas.
The modern sciences follow the same path: knowledge is found by assessing new ideas rather than pressing the limits of philosophy. Though scientific theories do not provide certainty , their impact on the modern society is apparent. Today, science is widely accepted as the mainstay of knowledge, scientists should also be cognisant of the problems of metaphysics.
Reference:
Russell, B. (1912). The Problems Of Philosophy. New York,, H. Holt and company.